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THE ROLE OF GENDER IN ENTREPRENEUR-INVESTOR RELATIONSHIPS:  
A SIGNALING THEORY APPROACH 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
This study adopts a gender perspective to analyze funding decisions made by an investment fund 
that invests equity stakes in new ventures. Prior research has indicated that there is gender 
skewness in risk capital investments resulting from a combination of demand- and supply-side 
issues. We apply signaling theory to examine the interface between demand and supply to 
understand gender biases related to risk capital investments. In-depth analyses of decision 
documents from four investment cases show that gender plays a role in the signals that are 
communicated in the prefunding entrepreneur-investor relationship.  
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Access to financial capital has been a core issue for researchers seeking to reveal the gendered 
aspects of entrepreneurial activity (Marlow & Patton, 2005; Minniti, 2009). Although there is little 
evidence of direct discrimination (Orser, Riding, & Manley, 2006; Verheul & Thurik, 2001), 
gender differences remain in entrepreneurs’ access to financial capital (Alsos, Isaksen, & 
Ljunggren, 2006; Carter, Shaw, Lam & Wilson, 2007). Structural dissimilarities between male- 
and female-owned businesses explain some, but not all, gender differences in funding profiles 
(Carter et al., 2007). The gender skewness is particularly clear in the case of external equity capital 
(Orser et al., 2006). The Diana Project raised awareness of this issue, demonstrating that the 
proportion of women receiving venture capital funding is disproportionate to the share of women 
entrepreneurs (Brush, Carter, Greene, Hart, & Gatewood, 2002). They argued that this may be the 
result of demand-side issues, such as gender differences in human capital, social capital or growth 
aspirations, or differences between men's and women's ventures (Carter, Brush, Greene, 
Gatewood, & Hart, 2003). However, they also found support for the argument that supply-side 
issues such as male dominance among investors and venture capitalists and traditions related to 
investment in male-dominated industries contribute to the gender skewness (Greene, Brush, Hart, 
& Saparito, 2001). Hence, the relationship between the demand side (entrepreneurs) and the supply 
side (investors) should be a major concern for researchers seeking to understand how gender 
affects new venture financing. 
 
The literature on gender and external equity capital has studied women as business owners 
(Becker-Blease & Sohl, 2007; Orser et al., 2006), as leaders (Brush, Carter, Gatewood, Greene & 
Hart, 2006) and, in a few cases, as investors (Harrison & Mason, 2007). These studies have given 
valuable insights into gender issues related to venture financing. However, as noted by Carter et 
al. (2007) in their study of bank lending to entrepreneurs, gender is embedded in entrepreneur-
financier relationships in ways that are more complex than the visible differences between women 
and men. For instance, gender is mutually intertwined with human capital, social capital, industry 
context, technology, and venture ideas. Accordingly, gender should not be isolated as a separate 
variable but instead perceived as embedded in the relations in which entrepreneurs operate. 
Following Granovetter (1985, p. 481), who argued that “…economic action is embedded in 
structures of social relations,” and acknowledging that these social relations are gendered (West 
& Zimmermann, 1987), we understand gender as always present when people act and interact. 
Thus, gender is embedded both in how society is structured and in individual choices (Lykke, 
2010). Consequently, gender is embedded in entrepreneur-investor relationships and may be 
present in the communication between entrepreneurs and investors. 
 
This study adopts a signaling theory approach to investigate how women and men present their 
venture concepts when approaching investors and how these signals are interpreted by the receiver. 
Signaling theory focuses on the credible communication of information to convey positive 
organizational attributes in situations with asymmetric information (Spence, 2002) and has been 
applied in studies on entrepreneur-investor relationships (Busenitz, Fiet, & Moesel, 2005; Davila, 
Foster, & Gupta, 2003; Elitzur & Gavious, 2003). Entrepreneurs can communicate credible signals 
regarding the venture’s prospects and their commitment to attract the interest of venture capitalists 
and other potential investors (Busenitz et al., 2005). For instance, important signals to investors 
are the founder’s individual reputation based on previous performance (Ebbers & Wijnberg, 2012), 
his or her own investment (Prasad, Bruton, & Vozikis, 2000), the perceived legitimacy of his or 
her top management team (Cohen & Dean, 2005), his or her social capital (Khoury, Junkunc, & 
Deeds, 2013), and engagement in trust-building behaviors (Maxwell & Lévesque, 2014).  
 
Although several studies have adopted signaling theory to explain different aspects of the venture 
financing processes (see Connelly, Certo, Ireland, & Reutzel, 2011 for an overview), the gendered 
nature of signaling has received scant attention (see, e.g., Eddelston, Ladge, Mitteness & 
Balachandra, 2014; Murphy, Kickul, Barbosa & Titus, 2007; Nelson, Maxfield & Kolb, 2009). By 
adopting a gender perspective on signaling theory, this paper focuses on the gendered nature of 
the signaling process between entrepreneurs and investors and identifies some of the ways in which 
this process is gendered. The study is based on unique archival data, including information on the 
signals sent by entrepreneurs as expressed in business plans and investment prospectuses, in 
addition to information on how these signals are perceived and interpreted, as expressed in 
documents prepared for the investment fund board and in internal notes made by the investment 
fund's employees. Analyzing these data, we are able to gain knowledge on gender issues related 
to the signaler and the receiver that influence received signals and thereby investment decisions. 
The following research questions are addressed:  
 
1. How is gender embedded in how entrepreneurs signal the quality of their ventures in 
business plans and investment prospectuses presented to investors? 
2. How is gender embedded in how signals are perceived by investors, and how does this 
influence investment decisions? 
 
The study employs a theory-building design, with the purpose of developing the understanding of 
the gender embeddedness of the signaling process. We aim to contribute to the literature in two 
ways. First, by analyzing the gendered aspects of signals sent (demand side) and of how signals 
are received and interpreted by an investment fund (supply side), we contribute to signaling theory 
by developing an understanding of how the signaling process is gendered in the context of new 
venture financing. Second, by focusing on the role of gender in the communication between 
entrepreneurs and investors, thereby adding to the literature seeking to debate the gender gap with 
respect to equity funding (Greene et al., 2001). Viewing gender as embedded in how people act 
and interact, we show how gender is constructed and reconstructed in the signaling process of 
venture financing, thereby potentially offering implications for financing decisions made by 
entrepreneurs and investors. 
 
 
 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
Signaling Theory 
Signaling theory has recently gained prominence in studies of investment decisions and 
entrepreneur-investor relationships. In this context, the theory is concerned with reducing 
information asymmetry between entrepreneurs and investors using information signals. The 
management literature has been particularly concerned with how information asymmetries 
concerning latent and unobservable quality can be resolved (Connelly et al., 2011). Entrepreneurs 
have access to extensive information about their venture and its economic potential, to which 
potential investors do not have access (Leland & Pyle, 1977). This information asymmetry leads 
potential investors to receive less-than-perfect information (Downes & Heinkel, 1982). 
Consequently, investors demand reliable signals of venture quality to reduce uncertainty in 
investment decisions. However, information asymmetry is not a problem unique to investors. 
Entrepreneurs who cannot transfer viable information to investors about their ventures to dispel 
doubts concerning both their own legitimacy and the investors’ potential earnings will experience 
difficulties receiving investor funding.  
 
Connelly et al. (2011) identify four key constructs of signaling theory: signaler, receiver, signal, 
and feedback. Signalers are insiders who have information that outsiders cannot directly access. 
In this context, they are the entrepreneurs (Elitzur & Gavious, 2003), managers (Lester, Certo, 
Dalton, Dalton, & Cannella, 2006), or board chairs of ventures seeking equity capital. Receivers 
are outsiders who lack information that they would like to obtain, in this context, business angels 
(Prasad et al., 2000), venture capitalists (Busenitz et al., 2005; Mueller, Westhead, & Wright, 
2012), IPO investors (Cohen & Dean, 2005; Lester et al., 2006) or others considering investing in 
the venture. Signals are the information sent from the signaler to the receiver to communicate 
information that is otherwise unobservable to the receiver, in this case information about venture 
quality. Feedback is the response to the received signal returned by the receiver to the signaler 
indicating the effectiveness of the signal. Thus, feedback can serve as the basis for signalers to 
adjust or refine their signals and to re-signal them to investors. Consequently, signaling can be 
viewed as a process through which signals are sent and received and interpreted and responded to, 
leading to new signals and interpretations. 
 
Studies on information signals in entrepreneur-investor relationships have examined various types 
of signals; see Table 1 for an overview. Signals concerning the quality of the entrepreneur and the 
entrepreneurial team are typically related to human and social capital, reputation and track record, 
and commitment and investments made by the entrepreneurial team. For instance, competences of 
the top management team have been found to be related to the amount of capital raised through an 
IPO (Zimmermann, 2008), and the amount of equity invested by the entrepreneur was found to 
influence the probability of funding success in a crowdfunding setting (Ahlers, Cumming, Günther 
& Sweizer, 2015). Furthermore, entrepreneurs signal venture quality through product descriptions, 
intellectual property and past performance. Venture quality can also be signaled through the 
involvement of other investors, alliances or partners. Signals may be strong or weak, more or less 
honest and reliable; additionally, they may vary in their correlation with unobservable quality 
(Connelly et al., 2011). They also may vary in terms of richness and relevance (Busenitz et al., 
2005). The effectiveness of signals depends on their observability and cost. Observability refers to 
the extent to which receivers can observe the signals sent. A particularly valuable competence of 
the entrepreneur will only have value as a signal if it can be communicated in a way so that 
investors can understand its value. Signal cost refers to how costly the signal is for the signaler. 
Costly signals are regarded as more credible as they are less likely to be fake (Lee, 2001). For 
instance, a certification or a patent are costly and credible signals on quality compared to 
descriptions of technology or routines.  
  
INSERT TABLE 1 HERE 
 
Although signals can be negative or positive and intentional or unintentional, signaling theory 
focuses primarily on actions taken by insiders to intentionally communicate positive but 
imperceptible qualities of a particular venture (Connelly et al., 2011). Consequently, signals 
depend on characteristics of the signaler and his or her venture, as signals representing real 
qualities appear more credible. Signaling can be used to compensate for constraints related to 
obtaining investor capital, and hence increase the chances of obtaining funding. Thus, signals sent 
by entrepreneurs to investors may differ depending on the spatial, cognitive or social proximity 
constraints experienced by the entrepreneur in relation to investors (Mueller et al., 2012). 
Entrepreneurs can deliberately use signals of quality to overcome venture-related factors that they 
expect investors to consider disadvantageous, such as an industry that the investor is less familiar 
with or the general lack of legitimacy related to women business owners (Murphy et al., 2007). 
Thus, there could be differences in the signals sent by male and female entrepreneurs to attract 
interest from investors. 
 
However, the extent to which signals are valued also depends on receiver attention, i.e., the extent 
to which receivers actively look for signals (Connelly et al., 2011). Signals sent might either be 
received or not. Investors tend to look for a specific set of criteria (Mason & Stark, 2004), and 
signals not conforming to these criteria may not be seen as relevant. Further, signals are not only 
received but also interpreted and translated into perceived meaning, which may depend upon the 
knowledge and the social context of the receiver (Connelly et al., 2011).  
 
Feedback has received less attention in the literature, but some studies have noted the importance 
of receivers giving signalers feedback on the effectiveness of the signals (Connelly et al., 2011). 
In entrepreneur-investor relationships, this feedback is an important part of the decision process, 
making the entrepreneurs change and improve their prospects during the process (Gulati & 
Higgins, 2003). Entrepreneurs can re-signal to investors to increase their legitimacy and better 
show how their venture fits to the investors' investment criteria. 
 
Gender aspects related to signaling have been limitedly explored. However, some recent studies 
have indicated that gender has an impact on evaluations of venture investment proposals (Bigelow, 
Lundmark, McLean Parks, & Wuebker, 2014) and that capital providers reward male and female 
entrepreneurs’ business characteristics differently (Eddleston et al., 2014). In the following 
section, we will discuss how we expect gender to influence the signaling process in entrepreneur-
investor relationships. 
 
Gender, Venture Financing and Information Signaling  
Acknowledging the embeddedness of gender in entrepreneur-investor relationships, there are 
several ways in which gender plays a role in this context. In this view, gender is seen as a social 
dynamic rather than a role, and the study of the influence of gender implies exploring how gender 
figures in social interaction (West & Zimmermann, 1987; Acker 1990), such as in the interaction 
between entrepreneurs and investors. Competence, for instance, is not purely a characteristic of a 
woman or a man, but socially constructed in the interactions influenced by the interpretations made 
by the actors involved (Pesonen, Tienari & Vanhala, 2009). Similarly, other characteristics of the 
entrepreneur, the team or the venture are also interpreted and given meaning in the interaction and 
communication between entrepreneurs and investors.  
 
Building on the understanding of gender as embedded in the entrepreneur-investor relationship, 
our analytical framework includes the key elements of signaling—signaler, signal, receiver and 
feedback (Connelly et al., 2011)—along with the key categories of signals found in the previous 
literature. Following the arguments above, gender is embedded in all of the elements below.  
 
Signalers may be male or female entrepreneurs, or teams consisting of both males and females. 
Although many studies have found that there are more similarities than differences between male 
and female entrepreneurs (Jennings & Brush, 2013), some studies have identified differences in 
human and social capital as one explanation for the gender gap in venture financing (Carter et al., 
2003; Greene et al., 2001). Women acquire less business-related human capital (Fairlie & Robb, 
2009), and have been found to have less entrepreneurial experience and experience from business 
financing (DeTienne & Chandler, 2007). Occupational segregation by industry and managerial 
level results in many women having less of the types of experiences that are highly valued by 
investors, such as management experience or experience in technology industries. Moreover, 
variations in social capital can have a negative impact on women’s entrepreneurship (Renzulli, 
Aldrich, & Moody, 2000). Because of the tendency toward homophily, implying that people with 
demographic similarities associate with one another (Brashears, 2008), such variations may cause 
women entrepreneurs to be less likely to include investors and venture capitalists in their networks 
and to less frequently engage in investor network activities (Becker-Blease & Sohl, 2007). With 
less business- or finance-specific human and social capital, women entrepreneurs may perceive 
that their initial legitimacy is lower when they approach investors, and to overcome that 
disadvantage by communicating information about attributes of their ventures that investors are 
assumed to value. Because women have not occupied entrepreneurial roles as frequently as men, 
signals of their legitimacy as entrepreneurs are more difficult to communicate (Murphy et al., 
2007). Consequently, women may have a greater need to signal their own and their ventures’ 
legitimacy to compensate for the lower legitimacy associated with being a woman.  
 
Signals may connote gender, which is well known from sociolinguistic research (e.g., Talbot, 
2010). First, potential gender differences in human, social and financial capital play a role in 
determining the signals sent. Studies of debt financing have found that women entrepreneurs 
establish firms with significantly less financial capital than do men (Shaw, Marlow, Lam, & Carter, 
2009). Furthermore, because access to funding by new and early-stage ventures frequently follows 
a “pecking order” in which entrepreneurs’ own resources provide the initial funding (Myers, 1984), 
gender-based differences in access to venture capital may reflect differential access to financial 
capital at earlier stages of the funding pipeline (Harrison & Mason, 2007). Entrepreneurs’ own 
investments serve as important signals to investors about the entrepreneurs' commitment and 
venture quality (Leland & Pyle, 1977; Prasad et al., 2000), with consequences for potential 
investors’ evaluations of venture prospectuses. To compensate for lower financial capital, female 
entrepreneurs may send stronger, more positive information signals by showing that they are 
socially linked to high-credibility others who do not suffer from the same legitimacy constraints. 
Murphy et al. (2007) found that female entrepreneurs who utilize expert capital relationships, i.e., 
contacts with experienced professionals to signal legitimacy, are more likely to procure funding 
through formal channels such as banks and venture capitalists. Moreover, Becker-Blease and Sohl 
(2007) argue that the gender gap in the venture capital market can partly be explained by women 
business owners’ lack of business angel involvement. Having a business angel ‘on board’ may 
serve as a strong signal of venture quality and expected return on investment. Hence, related to 
types of signals (cf. Table 1), the literature suggests that gender is embedded in the signals related 
to the entrepreneur/team (particularly human and social capital, and the entrepreneurs' own 
investment), the venture (particularly industry and firm characteristics), and relationship with 
investors.  
 
Signals are valuable only in how they are interpreted by the receiver. Investors and venture 
capitalists are predominantly men (Brush et al., 2002). It has been argued that the male dominance 
among investors and in relevant industries have consequences for how male and female 
entrepreneurs seeking finance are received (Greene et al., 2001). Venture capitalists often have 
more experience with male-led venture projects; and together with their education, preferences 
and behavioral patterns this may result in mental models that are gendered (Nelson et al., 2009), 
which may influence how investors, as signal receivers, interpret the signals sent by male and 
female entrepreneurs. For instance, investors have been found to hold gendered ideas on the 
institutional model of a successful entrepreneur (Nelson et al., 2009). Hence, one can assume that 
the receivers apply a gender filter when they assess the signalers and their signals. This is supported 
by gender role congruity theory (as applied by, e.g., Eddleston et al., 2014).  
 Investors and investment funds are more familiar with certain industries because of their 
experience and strategic investment choices. Consequently, investors tend to have more 
knowledge about male-dominated industries (Greene et al., 2001) and are better able to judge the 
credibility of signals related to ventures in these industries (Nelson et al., 2009). Furthermore, 
stereotypical ascriptions imply that women entrepreneurs are perceived as having different goals, 
resources and behaviors than men, which investors may interpret as riskier investments (Greene et 
al., 2001). Moreover, venture capitalists have been found to favor entrepreneurial teams with 
members who have characteristics similar to their own (Franke, Gruber, Harhoff, & Henkel, 2006). 
This tendency toward homophily may lead male investors to disfavor women entrepreneurs. 
Consequently, women face stronger needs to signal their own and their ventures’ legitimacy to 
compensate for structural barriers and stereotypical ascriptions.  
 
Finally, receivers may send countersignals. This feedback can make entrepreneurs aware of their 
potential lack of legitimacy and allow them to adjust and refine their signals (re-signal) to 
compensate. However, gendered differences in experience among entrepreneurs and their teams 
may influence their ability to interpret such feedback and to re-signal effectively, and gender-based 
interpretations made by investors may result in different feedback being given to male versus 
female entrepreneurs.  
 
Following the above discussion, this study analyses how gender is embedded in the characteristics 
of the entrepreneurs as signalers and in the signals sent, as well as in how signals are interpreted 
by the receivers. Further, acknowledging that signaling is a process, gender may also be embedded 
in the feedback given by the investor and the re-signaling made by the entrepreneurs. Next, the 
method and empirical data of this study are presented. 
 
METHOD 
Context 
The study uses archival data from a small investment fund in Norway. When employing extant 
texts, it is necessary to contextualize them (Charmaz, 2006). The Norwegian VC industry is 
growing, but it remains small relative to GDP, compared with many other European countries 
(NVCA, 2011). According to the annual report of the Norwegian private equity and venture capital 
association (NVCA, 2011), there were 105 funds and 51 investment trusts in Norway in 2010. In 
addition, there are approximately 4,500 business angels (Menon, 2011). The venture 
capital/private equity industry in Norway is, as in many other countries, highly gender skewed on 
both the supply and demand sides. Venture capital funds usually work with male-dominated 
industries (Ljunggren & Foss, 2012). The sector distribution of venture capital fund portfolio 
companies in 2010 showed that ICT was by far the largest group, followed by the life sciences, 
petroleum and sustainable energy (NVCA, 2011).  
 
The Investment Fund 
This unique dataset consists of the entire archive from a small investment fund in Norway and 
includes business plans and investment prospectuses presented by entrepreneurs seeking funding, 
analyses and documents presented to the fund board, the fund manager’s informal notes with 
background material, and minutes from board meetings. The investment fund is a private-public 
partnership with a capital base of approximately 35 million NOK1 (€ 4 million).2 The purpose is 
“to make commercially motivated investments and/or subordinated debt in the early stages of 
innovative companies in the region based on the possibility of return” (Investment Fund Articles, 
§3). The fund has no specific industry profile and can invest in all types of ventures except real 
estate. During the period of this study, there were two different fund managers: a female (2005-
2008) and a male (2008-2013). During the same period, the fund had two male trainees for 6-
month periods. The fund board consists of seven members appointed by the fund’s regional 
stakeholders. The board makes all investment decisions and decisions regarding investment 
strategies and investment criteria. Because Norway has a law requiring quotas for board members 
in private-public partnership organizations, 40 percent of the board members were women.  
 
Data material  
The fund considered 50 cases for investment between its start-up (2005) and the time we finished 
gathering our data (2013). This includes all cases that had been in contact with the investment fund 
that were regarded as interesting for the fund to evaluate. Among the evaluated cases, 19 resulted 
in investment. Two of these cases included women lead entrepreneurs, and the remaining cases 
included only male lead entrepreneurs. There were no gender mixed teams among the funded 
projects. Although the fund has considered a limited number of cases, the archive provides detailed 
information on signals sent by the entrepreneurs and signals received by the fund throughout the 
                                                 
1 1€ = 9.6 NOK, 1$ = 8 NOK. 
2 A precondition for access was to treat the fund and its clients with full discretion. Thus, all cases are altered for 
anonymity. 
relationship between the entrepreneurs and the fund. Hence, it offers unique and valuable insights 
relevant for in-depth qualitative analyses related to the role of gender in signaling processes.  
 
Using archival documents as the data source gives the advantage of data produced in real time, 
chronological data and data that reflect the information available to decision makers in the 
decision-making process. Hence, compared to retrospective data, archival information is not 
influenced by what occurred at later stages (e.g., whether the project was funded) and does not 
suffer from selective memory or other biases resulting from retrospective accounts. Archival 
information from business plans and investment prospectuses has previously been successfully 
used in studies of venture financing (Bruton, Chahine & Filatotchev, 2009; Kirch, Goldfarb & 
Gera, 2009; Martens, Jennings & Jennings, 2007; Zimmerman, 2008), but remains an under-
utilized resource in new venture research (Forbes & Kirsch, 2011). Also previous studies of 
signaling by entrepreneurs seeking financing have utilized business plans and IPO and investment 
prospectuses as data sources (e.g., Daily, Certo & Dalton, 2006; Khoury et al., 2013; Parhankangas 
& Ehrlich, 2014; Zimmerman, 2008). Our study additionally analyzes the documents prepared by 
the investment fund concerning how the fund manager and board interpret the information 
delivered by the entrepreneurs. This allows for analyses not only of the signals sent but also of 
how those signals are received by the fund. Further, the written communication between the fund 
and the entrepreneurs during their relationship is included, which enables analyses of how signals 
and interpretations develop over time.  
 
The data consist of archival material related to the investment cases of the fund, including:  
- Material delivered by the entrepreneurs such as business plans, investment prospectuses, 
Power Point presentations and budgets 
- Notes taken by the fund manager during meetings and conversations with the entrepreneurs 
- E-mail correspondence between the fund manager and entrepreneurs 
- The investment fund's evaluation of the investment cases 
- Decision documents prepared for board meetings 
- Memorandums and protocols from board meetings, including decisions made.  
The volume of material varies across the cases, based on the duration of the relationship and other 
characteristics of the decision processes. In total, the material constituted approximately 2 shelf 
meters of papers, varying between a few to several hundred pages per case.   
 
Sampling 
The research design was structured to enable theory building. We employ a multi-case design with 
theoretical sampling (Eisenhardt & Graebner 2007); hence, the cases are selected because they 
illuminate the phenomenon in which we are interested. We conducted in-depth analyses of four of 
the investment cases evaluated and funded by the investment fund, selected based on the following 
criteria: 
1. To avoid bias related to differences in project quality and to ensure the existence of a long-
term relationship with signaling and re-signaling to analyze, all included cases should have 
received equity funding from the fund. The funded cases also have a longer relationship 
with the fund, and hence more documents to analyze to observe signals sent and received. 
2. To ensure comparability among the cases, they should all have been in the early phase of 
establishment at the point of first contact with the fund.  
3. To allow for cross-case contrasting, we sought a similar number of cases with women lead 
entrepreneurs and with men lead entrepreneurs.  
4. To avoid excessive differences between the male and female cases related to other 
important aspects besides gender, we sought to obtain pairwise similar cases in terms of 
the size of the business and the required amount of funding.  
 
Data Analysis 
The material, including business plans, prospectuses, board meeting documents and internal 
documents from the investor fund, were divided between the two authors, each of whom coded 
the material, following one case at a time chronologically. Field notes were compared after 1/3 of 
the data coding and again near the end of the process to ensure that both researchers focused on 
the same issues. Differences were discussed and resolved, and the archival material was consulted 
again when necessary to fill in missing information. For the purpose of this paper, data are analyzed 
in detail by applying theoretical concepts from the literature (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007) as 
presented in the analytical framework. We searched for expressions and articulations that 
represented each of the signal categories both in the documents presented by the entrepreneurs 
(business plans, investment prospectuses) and in the documents presented by the investment fund, 
including interpretations of these signals (board documents, analyses, notes, minutes). Each case 
was first analyzed separately, after which a cross-case analysis was conducted. The analysis was 
iterative, oscillating between the literature and data. Beginning with a theoretical pre-
understanding, the analysis was inductive, allowing themes that emerged from the data to be 
further elaborated upon (cf. Charmaz, 2006).  
 
Case Descriptions 
 
Case A: Fitness and spa center. The venture was established in 2007 by two women. When they 
approached the investment fund (in 2007), they had not yet begun to engage in production or sales. 
Entrepreneur A1 has private-sector experience in the field of well-being and fitness as well as in 
banking. Entrepreneur A2 has experience from the public sector, particularly within human 
resource management. When they approached the investment fund, their board consisted of 
Entrepreneur A1, a woman with a management position in an accounting firm, and a male board 
chair with experience in the oil and gas industry. The chair was described quite thoroughly in the 
case documents to the fund board (24 words), whereas the female business manager at an 
accounting firm was described less thoroughly (7 words). The notes from the fund manager to the 
board state: “The entrepreneurs have a good idea, but no experience with entrepreneurship.” 
Further, the following was noted about one of the potential (female) external shareholders: “She 
is an entrepreneur and is married to a physician.”  
 
Case B: Health equipment. The health equipment firm was established by two female 
entrepreneurs in 2009. When they contacted the investment fund (in 2009), they were developing 
the product and had made some test sales. They were experienced nurses who taught at a nursing 
college. Their idea was a specially designed apron to be used by nurses to avoid the spread of 
infection. In the case documents to the fund board, the trainee at the investment fund noted, 
“...female nurses do not want to wear infectious protection unless it looks OK.” The entrepreneurs 
had participated in an innovation seminar were they presented their idea and received help to 
further develop it, e.g., by investigating its market potential. “The entrepreneurs' competence is a 
strength for the project as the idea originates from their experiences as nurses,” the case documents 
stated. The venture had received a small amount of equity funding from another minor fund and a 
grant from a public agency. They had applied for more public funding. At the time they approached 
the investment fund, their board consisted of a board chair who was a lawyer (male), the manager 
of the incubator where the business was located (male), a specialist in protection against infection 
(male) and the two entrepreneurs (female). 
 
Case C: News site. The firm was started in 2007 by two male entrepreneurs with background in 
journalism. Their business model was to produce local news, to provide free access for readers and 
to rely on advertising revenue as a source of income. By the time of the initial contact with the 
investment fund, they were at an early stage but had some customers. In the score sheet provided 
to the fund board, the entrepreneurs' strategy was described as “aiming for a trustworthy editorial 
product that attracts many readers and thereby becomes attractive for advertisers.” They 
approached the investment fund shortly after launching their first issue of the news site. They 
needed additional financial capital because more time than expected was required to attract enough 
readers and to realize the necessary advertising revenue to fund the launch of new issues. The 
investment fund manager described the entrepreneurs as “knowing the journalism profession and 
being enthusiastic”. The board consisted of a male chair, who is a business consultant 
(shareholder), one female business angel (shareholder), two male shareholders and the two 
entrepreneurs, who also hold shares. The investment fund manager described the firm’s board as 
having complementary competences. 
 
Case D: Online service. The venture was established in 2005. The entrepreneur is a portfolio 
entrepreneur who was well known in the community and had considerable experience in the media 
industry. When approaching the investment fund in 2006, he was still working on developing 
technological solutions. He was described by the investment fund manager as “trustworthy, serious 
and honest, and he has a strong drive that will enable success.” Further, the case documents for the 
fund board described him as having a relevant employment background: “… he has a good track 
record in establishing new business ventures. He has previously succeeded, he shows that he is 
serious, he has stamina and he has a focus on sales and marketing. The entrepreneur has a good 
understanding of the market and his customers.” The online service had private investors and had 
received a grant from a public agency. When the entrepreneur approached the investment fund, 
the firm’s board consisted of four men, all of whom were shareholders. In the prospectus, the 
entrepreneur stated, “at present the board members are too similar. We will be ambitious when 
recruiting new and better members to the board. They have to be critical, clear-thinking, and 
capable; some also need to have experience in international business.” 
 
 
ANALYSIS AND RESULTS 
 
Table 2 summarizes results from the data coding. It shows the signals sent as presented in business 
plans and financing prospectuses sorted along the main signal categories presented in Table 1; 
entrepreneur, team, investors, venture and partners/alliances. Furthermore, it presents signals 
perceived and interpreted by the investment fund as presented in analyses, board documents, notes 
and minutes from board meetings, sorted along the same main categories. Finally, where 
applicable, the fund’s feedback is presented, together with the entrepreneurs’ responses re-signaled 
to the investment fund. Below, we discuss how gender is embedded in the signals sent and received 
(see also Table 2).  
 
INSERT TABLE 2 HERE 
 
Gender Embedded in Signals Entrepreneurs Send 
The first research question addresses how gender is embedded in the way in which entrepreneurs 
signal venture quality. In all cases, the entrepreneurs signal that their own competence is relevant 
to the venture. They all emphasize industry experience in their venture prospectuses. Additionally, 
the two female team cases present relevant education and relevant work experience from the public 
sector as signals of competence. In Case D, the entrepreneur signals entrepreneurial experience. In 
all cases, the extended team, often referred to as the board, is used to signal competence. Both of 
the female cases emphasize the competence of their male board chairs and focus on their board 
members’ relevant experience. The male entrepreneur cases also emphasize the competence of 
their male board chairs. Furthermore, Case D reports limitations of team competence (lack of 
international experience, lack of heterogeneity) and signals ambitions to change the board to 
address these drawbacks. Thus, overall, the female and male entrepreneurs follow somewhat 
similar approaches to signaling related to entrepreneur and team competences. Because the 
entrepreneurs have different human and social capital, their signals appear different. The female 
entrepreneurs compensate for a lack of legitimacy as entrepreneurs (no entrepreneurial experience, 
limited private sector experience/management experience) by specifically emphasizing the 
relevance of the experience they do have and by underlining board members with such experience, 
particularly with respect to male board chairs. Male entrepreneurs also focus on their board 
members’ competence. Case D seems to have the team with the strongest human and social capital 
and specifies weaknesses to increase signal credibility and the venture’s legitimacy. Accordingly, 
the entrepreneur shows that he ‘knows what it takes,’ thus confirming the value of his experience. 
 
In all cases, the entrepreneurs signal venture quality by reporting that other investors are interested. 
When they approached the investment fund, Cases C and D had other investors ‘on board’ who 
had invested and expressed interest in increasing their investment through a new share issue. This 
is a stronger and more credible signal, compared to the female Case A that signaled that they had 
interested investors who had not yet invested. However, the weaker signal of interested investors 
is nevertheless a signal of quality in contrast to Case B, which only had a minor ownership 
investment from another small investment fund and no contact with investors when they first 
approached the investment fund. All of the cases received feedback from the investment fund that 
they needed to obtain more equity. Case C re-signaled that they had approached existing and 
potential shareholders to increase equity capital. Case D ran parallel processes with the investment 
fund and a seed fund and secured increased investments from existing shareholders. Case A re-
signaled that they had secured investments from two informal investors but had to request 
additional time to secure the second investor. Case B chose a strategy of attempting to secure a 
public grant to cover the capital requirements and took time to secure the capital needed to respond 
to the investment fund’s conditions. Hence, the male entrepreneurial teams had spent more time 
securing investment capital before they first approached the investment fund and seemed to have 
clearer strategies on how to secure the funding required. However, the female Case A was also 
able to secure relatively large equity funding from informal investors before further negotiations 
with the investment fund.  
 
With respect to venture characteristics, the two women-owned ventures are both related to 
feminine industries (i.e. industries with female work force and primarily female customers/end 
users), whereas the two men-owned ventures are in .com industries with a mixed customer base, 
while their entrepreneurs and employees are predominately male. Consequently, the signals of 
femininity are strengthened with the combination of female entrepreneurs and a feminine industry 
in the two first cases, whereas the two latter cases give a masculine impression in line with the 
gendered understanding of the ‘entrepreneur’ (Marlow & Swail, 2014). Cases A and C are directed 
toward the consumer market, Case B is directed toward the public sector, and Case D is a business-
to-business concept. Cases A and D both signal clear—and ambitious—predictions of future sales 
and clear sales strategies to increase venture credibility. Case D signals strong international growth 
potential. Case B indicates ambitions by signaling opportunities to expand nationally, although the 
growth ambitions are not as strongly presented as in Cases A and D. Case C appeals to societal 
needs to break a market monopoly and the value of a local product. Case B focuses on the 
innovativeness of the product and how it will solve user needs. None of the cases places any 
emphasis on strategic alliances or partners. However, in re-signaling, the women entrepreneurs 
responded to perceived legitimacy constraints by initiating activities to get partners in place, 
especially to help test market interest. 
 
To summarize, we find that gender is embedded in signals sent in several ways. First, to the extent 
that the male and female entrepreneurs differed in terms of human and social capital, they chose 
different strategies in presenting signals and compensating for limitations by focusing on other 
signal groups. Second, whereas male entrepreneurs followed a homophily strategy by engaging 
competent males similar to themselves as chairs of their boards, the women entrepreneurs chose a 
compensation strategy by engaging male chairs with complementary experience and competence. 
Third, gender is embedded in the signals related to the characteristics of the ventures. Fourth, due 
to more progress with other equity investors the two male cases appear more ‘professional’ and 
provides a faster response to feedback demanding additional equity capital, compared with the two 
female cases.  
 
Gender Embedded in Signals the Investment Fund Receives 
The second research question addresses how gender is embedded in how signals are received and 
interpreted by the investor and, therefore, in how they influence investment decisions. Table 2 
indicates that not all signals sent are received by the investment fund and that missing signals may 
be interpreted as (negative) signals. This phenomenon is visible, for instance, with respect to 
human capital, particularly entrepreneurial experience. In both of the two female cases, decision 
documents specifically note that the entrepreneurs lack entrepreneurial experience. However, in 
Case C, in which the male entrepreneurs do not report entrepreneurial experience, this deficit is 
not mentioned. Instead, the fund’s documents focus on the entrepreneurs’ strong industry 
experience and that they are enthusiastic. Further, the documents do not mention that the 
technology is new to the entrepreneurs. In Case D, the entrepreneurial experience and track record 
of the male lead entrepreneur is emphasized as a key argument for investment and are interpreted 
as a strong signal that provides legitimacy to the potential of the venture. The entrepreneur’s track 
record is mentioned several times in the documents. He is considered serious, honest, and as a 
person with stamina, based on his entrepreneurial experience. However, the fact that the 
entrepreneur’s industry experience was as a customer, is not noted by the investment fund. Instead, 
it is regarded as positive that he understands the market and the customers, and that he focuses on 
marketing and sales. This is different from Case B, in which both of the female entrepreneurs have 
experience in the public health sector where their potential buyers are. In this case, however, the 
entrepreneurs’ experience is not advanced as a positive aspect in the investment fund’s documents.  
 
Other types of experience are also interpreted as positive signals. In Case A, the fund manager 
notes that one of the investors (the woman) is married to a physician, and this is perceived as 
positive, strengthening the venture’s quality and the investor’s legitimacy. Further, in Case A the 
sales competence of one of the female entrepreneurs is valued; she is described as “a good 
salesperson,” something that the investment fund’s board experienced when she presented the 
venture. However, public-sector experience, education, and experience in banking are not 
emphasized as particularly positive or relevant. Similarly, in Case B, the entrepreneurs’ experience 
as nurses is mentioned as positive, but not treated as important. In both of these cases, the 
investment fund documents highlight the board chair as having a “good reputation” or being “well 
known.” Thus, it seems that these entrepreneurs can build legitimacy through their male chairs. In 
Case C, it is specifically noted that “the chair has start-up and funding experience”. In Case D, in 
which the entrepreneur signals a lack of persons with international experience in the board, the 
investment fund relies on that judgment. That the entrepreneur is aware of this limitation seems to 
give him legitimacy.  
 
The investment fund has a positive opinion of the business ideas in all four venture-cases, 
remarking that there is a growing market in Cases A and D, and that there is a need for the product 
in Cases B and C. However, the strength of the competition is particularly emphasized in Case A, 
noting that there is already one very strong actor in the market. A similar situation related to Case 
C is interpreted as a need to break the market monopoly that exists locally. However, also in Case 
C, the investment fund highlights strong competition in the local market but regards it as a positive 
that the entrepreneurs employ a clear market strategy. It is further perceived negatively that, in this 
case, sales have not developed according to plan. Case D is interpreted as a venture that represents 
something new and has high growth potential, a global market, market growth and exit options. 
The fact that the entrepreneur has ideas for further development contributes to this judgment. The 
investment board documents further state: “This is most likely the most interesting business case 
in the region at the moment”. It is noted that the entrepreneur has mentioned going public as an 
exit option. 
 
Case D had investors in place when they approached the investment fund. Further, the entrepreneur 
was engaged in dialogue with a seed fund and was obtaining increased investments from business 
angels. These activities are regarded positively by the investment fund. Case C also had investors 
involved in the venture, although at a much smaller scale. Still, this seemed to increase legitimacy. 
For instance, the investment fund interprets the involvement of investors as a signal that it is likely 
that the entrepreneurs will be able to raise more financial capital, indicating that investors' 
reputation is a signal well received (cf. Janney & Folta, 2006). As mentioned above, the two female 
cases fell short with respect to investors. In Case A, this seemed to increase the risk perceived by 
the investment fund. But after showing that they were able to raise investor capital (re-signaling), 
the fund reported a stronger belief in the venture’s potential. In Case B, the investment fund seemed 
to have no trust in the entrepreneurs’ ability to raise investor capital, and hence they did not demand 
it. Instead, they accepted that the entrepreneurs planned to build the business step-by-step and to 
use public grants to raise capital, i.e., without bringing on new owners. Thus, it may appear that a 
pre-understanding of what can be expected from women entrepreneurs in female industries 
compared to male entrepreneurs in more masculine industries influenced the expectations that the 
investment fund had to the venture and, thus, what it demanded from the entrepreneurs.  
 
As mentioned above, none of the cases emphasized alliances in their signals, and this was not an 
initial focus of the investment fund. However, when both women-led cases re-signaled that they 
were forming new alliances following the feedback, the fund manager interpreted this positively. 
Thus, it seems that signals concerning alliances can increase the legitimacy and signal quality of 
female business cases.  
 
From these cases, we find that gender is embedded in how signals are interpreted by investors. 
First, because there are some differences in the signals sent, the cases are also evaluated differently. 
The fund considers and evaluates most of the entrepreneurs’ signals. Further, as the women 
entrepreneurs had limited track-records and were not previously known to the investment fund 
manager or fund board, they were evaluated only by the signals that they sent. In contrast, the male 
entrepreneurs were previously known and were also evaluated according to other knowledge 
possessed by the investment fund manager or board members. Second, the findings illustrate how 
similar characteristics are interpreted differently depending on gender. Third, gendered 
expectations related to entrepreneurs are found to influence the demands made and thus the 
evaluation of a venture’s prospects.  
 
 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS  
 
The present study has applied signaling theory on investment decisions made by a small 
investment fund. The paper set out to reveal how gender is embedded in how entrepreneurs signal 
venture quality in the written material they present to investors and in what way gender is 
embedded in how signals are perceived by investors. The findings indicate that gender influences 
venture capital funding both related to how entrepreneurs signal venture quality and legitimacy 
and in how the fund (receiver) interprets those signals. The results show that gender plays a role, 
not only as differences between male and female entrepreneurs, but more importantly, in the 
interaction between entrepreneurs and investors where venture types, human and social capital, 
investor and partner relations, etc. are constructed as gendered. From the analyses, we have 
identified at least three ways in which signals between entrepreneurs and investors are gender 
embedded.  
 
First, differences in financial, human and social capital between male and female entrepreneurs, 
give gender differences in the information they can signal. Such differences can be ascribed to 
gender divisions in education and work experience, and have previously been advanced as a factor 
leading to gender differences related to venture capital (Carter et al., 2003). This study shows that 
women seek to compensate for their lack of the most valued types of human and social capital by 
following at least two strategies. They signal the value of other types of human and social capital, 
such as the relevance of the experience they have, and they involve men who hold valued 
competencies as board members and, particularly, as board chairs (cf. Murphy et al., 2007). The 
male entrepreneurs seem to have a lesser need to use such compensatory signaling strategies. This 
is in line with Eddlestone et al.'s (2014, p. 18) findings that “…the gender of the sender plays an 
important role in determining how signals of entrepreneurial viability and commitment are 
compensated by capital providers,” and further that men and women's signals of the quality of their 
ventures are rewarded differently (op cit). 
 
Second, investors and investment funds are more familiar with some industries and types of 
ventures, due to their experience and strategic investment choices (Greene et al., 2001; Nelson et 
al., 2009). Since there are relatively large differences in relation to the industries and venture types 
pursued by male and female entrepreneurs (Elam, 2008), women with ventures in feminine 
industries (in terms of employees, customers and products) may have an increased need to find 
suitable and transferrable signals that can be received and interpreted positively by investors. In 
this study, one example was how industry experience in the “feminine” spa and fitness industry 
was less valued as a signal than industry experience from the more masculine petroleum industry, 
despite that the new venture idea was a fitness and spa center. Hence, in line with status 
expectations state theory, this can be interpreted as the (masculine) competence from the petroleum 
industry has higher status expectations than the (feminine) competence related to the spa and 
fitness industry, and that gender is a marker of social status in entrepreneur-financer relationships 
(Saparito, et al. 2013). 
 
Third, stereotypical ascriptions of women and men influence interpretations of signals. As 
entrepreneurship remains a masculine domain, women must communicate their legitimacy more 
strongly to overcome the inherent gender bias in the interpretation of signals. The entrepreneur’s 
gender and the gendered image of entrepreneurship seem to be part of the evaluation. This finding 
is in line with gender role congruity theory, explaining how gender stereotypes lead to different 
standards applied for women and men (cf. Eddlestone et al., 2014). Also, Saparito et al. (2013:854), 
in their study of bank-firm relationships, claim that “gender as a marker of social status should be 
considered as a distinct factor influencing” this relationship and that this has consequences for 
resource acquisition. In the cases presented here, we found that similar lack of experience, such as 
entrepreneurial experience, was interpreted differently for male and female entrepreneurs. 
Correspondingly, a similar signaling of experience was interpreted as a positive signal in one of 
the male cases but was not valued in one of the female cases. Further, the female entrepreneurs 
were described very differently from the ‘typical’ entrepreneur, particularly in one case. This is in 
line with Nelson et al.'s (2009:64) findings that VCs employ a gendered mental model “… in so 
far as it constructs a hierarchy of order along lines of gender, including notions of venture potential 
and venture success…”. Consequently, women may have a stronger need to signal their own and 
their ventures’ legitimacy to compensate for their lower perceived legitimacy related to being a 
woman. When women entrepreneurs compensate by signaling more ‘masculine’ elements such as 
growth ambitions or by including competent men on their teams (Murphy et al., 2007), this 
influences interpretations and seems to strengthen their legitimacy. Further, receivers ascribe 
meanings to groups of signals, i.e. different signals are aggregated and jointly interpreted 
(Connelly et al., 2011). Gender is also embedded in the aggregation of signals, in which gendered 
attributes are ‘added’ to other attributes, leading to different interpretations of, e.g., industry 
experience. 
 
The results provide insights into the entrepreneur-investor relationship related to new business 
ventures and show that this relationship is gendered. Access to unique archival data, including 
information not only on the signals that entrepreneurs send, but also on how an investment fund 
interprets these signals, has proven valuable to gain insights into gendered aspects of the 
investment process. However, the study also has limitations, of which we highlight two. First, the 
data represent one small investment fund in Norway, and the available number of cases were 
limited. Hence, further studies are needed to validate and nuance our findings and theoretical 
contributions. Moreover, different types of investors seek out different criteria (Mason & Stark, 
2004), and the gendered nature of the processes may vary among different contexts. Thus, further 
research is needed to examine other types of investors and other contexts. Second, investment 
decisions are not solely based on written documents but also include oral discussions among the 
fund’s board members. Information on the oral communication would have been beneficial to gain 
even further depth in the analysis. Similarly, to have information on the oral feedback given to 
entrepreneurs in meetings with the fund would have enriched the data. Studies including 
observation of meetings and oral dialogues between entrepreneurs and potential investors are 
warranted.  
 
Despite these limitations, the study has important implications. The findings show that to 
understand the gender gap in new venture financing, one needs to understand how gender is 
embedded in the signaling taking place in entrepreneur-investor relationships. This study shows 
that the masculine norm of entrepreneurship influences investment decisions. Investors evaluate 
both male and female entrepreneurs in relation to characteristics more often held by men and 
neglect signals more often presented by women. Stereotypical gender ascriptions influence the 
interpretations of signals received, leading investment funds to interpret similar characteristics 
differently between male and female entrepreneurs. Although both demand- and supply-side issues 
are important, researchers should also examine the constructions of gender and entrepreneurship 
that occur in interactions between the demand and supply sides.  
 
Moreover, the study informs signaling theory by showing how entrepreneurs’ signals and 
receivers' interpretations are embedded in gender. Signaling theory has not previously considered 
how gender influences the signaling process. The results of this study suggest that a gender 
perspective can improve our understanding of this process, not only in entrepreneur-investor 
relationships but probably also in other types of signaling processes. In a broader perspective, 
signaling theory seldom discusses the social construction of signals that are taking place in the 
signaling process, which also may be related to other areas than gender, such as ethnicity, or social 
class.  
 
Implications for investors are that they need to be aware of the embeddedness of gender in the 
signaling process to improve their decision-making. Such awareness is needed to ensure that funds 
do not discard good cases due to stereotypical ascriptions in interpreting signals. Furthermore, 
awareness may also reduce the risk that a fund will develop overly positive evaluations of the 
signals sent by male entrepreneurs with masculine venture ideas. Entrepreneurs approaching 
investors need to consider the criteria valued by an investment fund. Women entrepreneurs may 
need to be aware that they must signal their and their venture’s quality more strongly to be 
evaluated similarly to men. Using more masculine signals might be helpful.    
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Table 1 Categories of signals sent between entrepreneur and potential investors 
Type of signal Studies 
Entrepreneur  
- Human and social capital 
- Reputation and previous performance 
- Trust-building behavior 
- Displayed passion 
- Entrepreneurs’ own investment 
 
Kotha & George (2012), Mueller et al. (2012)  
Ebbers & Wijnberg (2012) 
Maxwell & Lévesque (2011) 
Cardon, Sudek, & Mitteness (2009) 
Leland & Pyle (1977), Prasad et al. (2000), Bruton, et al. (2009) 
Team (management and board) 
- Aggregated HC and SC  
- Top management team legitimacy 
- Prestige 
- Team experience 
- Team/board heterogeneity and size 
 
- External board members 
- CEO background 
 
Certo (2003), Higgins & Gulati (2006), Mueller et al. (2012) 
Cohen & Dean (2005) 
Lester et al. (2006), Certo (2003), Daily, et al. (2005) 
Lester et al. (2006) 
Filatotchev & Bishop (2002), Daily et al. (2005), Zimmerman (2008) 
Sanders & Boivie (2004), Daily et al. (2005) 
Zhang & Wiersema (2009) 
Investors 
- Investors equity ownership 
 
- Investors experience and reputation 
- Private equity placements 
- Publicly backed equity finance 
 
Elitzur & Gavious (2003), Sanders & Boivie (2004),  
Daily et al. (2005), Bruton et al. (2009) 
Janney & Folta (2006) 
Janney & Folta (2003), Janney & Folta (2006) 
Mueller et al. (2012) 
Venture  
- Products/services characteristics 
- name 
- Size and age 
- Firm growth 
- Patented IP 
- Trading volume 
- (Expected) returns 
- Corporate governance characteristics 
 
Mueller et al. (2012) 
Lee (2001) 
Daily et al. (2005) 
Davila et al. (2003) 
Mueller et al. (2012) 
Lee (2001) 
Lee (2001), Daily et al. (2005) 
Sanders & Boivie (2004) 
Alliances and partners 
- Strategic alliances 
 
- Endorsement relationships 
 
Gulati & Higgins (2003), Park & Mezias (2005), Khoury et al. (2013) 
Gulati & Higgins (2003), Higgins & Gulati (2006), Khoury et al. 
(2013) 
 
 
 
  
Table 2 Key elements of signaling in the four cases  
Signaler Signals sent Signals interpreted Feedback and re-signaling 
 
Case A: Fitness 
and SPA center  
 
Two female 
entrepreneurs 
Entrepreneurs 
Industry experience 
Relevant education 
Management experience 
Sales experience 
 
Team (management/board) 
2 external board members:  
- Male chair experienced in the 
oil and gas industry 
- Female auditor and manager 
of accounting firm 
 
Investors  
Initial contact and interest from 
two informal investors: 
- male entrepreneur (property) 
- female entrepreneur (retail) 
Minor public grant  
 
Venture  
Unique concept targeting 
growing high end segment 
Specified competitive advantg. 
Specified sales goals 
 
Partners/alliances 
Agreement with property 
investor about premises 
 
Entrepreneurs 
No entrepreneurial experience 
Good sales person 
Management experience 
Public sector experience  
 
Team (management/board) 
Limited experience in 
management and board 
The chair has a good 
reputation—“ is a good man” 
 
 
Investors 
Male investor owns premises—
vested interest  
Female investor is entrepreneur 
and married to a physician  
Minor public grant 
 
Venture 
Strong competition locally 
Good strategy 
Acceptable risk 
 
 
Partners/alliances 
Landlord also (potential) 
investor 
Feedback 
Informal investors a 
condition—each must invest as 
much as the fund 
Entrepreneurs should reduce 
ownership to less than 50% 
 
Re-signaling 
Positive market response before 
opening 
Possibly increased grant from 
governmental support agency 
New female investor replaces 
the previous suggested investor 
Two investors increase amount 
invested, equal to investment 
fund 
Entrepreneur ownership down 
to 55% but will be reduced to 
46% by selling shares to 
employees 
 
Case B: Health 
equipment 
producer  
 
Two female 
entrepreneurs 
Entrepreneurs 
Relevant education 
Long industry experience 
Explicit user knowledge 
Unique network 
 
Team (management/board) 
3 external board members: 
- Male chair, lawyer 
- Male member, consultant 
- Male member, physician  
 
Investors 
Small post from private 
investment fund in place 
Minor public grant  
Applied for start-up grant 
 
Venture 
Innovative design, IPR under 
consideration 
Entrepreneurs 
Experienced nurses 
No entrepreneurial experience 
Good industry network  
 
 
Team (management/board) 
The chair is well known 
 
 
 
 
Investors 
More financial capital needed—
grant and/or equity 
 
 
 
Venture 
Potential growth company 
High risk—early stage 
Feedback 
Increased equity condition for 
investment—more private 
equity needed  
Stockholder agreement has to 
secure the entrepreneurs 
engagement and some 
ownership  
 
Re-signaling 
Initial contact made with 
possible marketing alliance 
Will seek to increase financial 
capital 
Signaler Signals sent Signals interpreted Feedback and re-signaling 
 
Partners/alliances 
In business incubator 
 
 
Partners/alliances 
(not considered) 
 
Case C: News 
site  
 
Two male 
entrepreneurs 
Entrepreneurs 
Industry experience, product 
knowledge 
 
Team (management/board) 
Male chair, business consultant 
Female business angel 
Two males and the 
entrepreneurs 
 
 
Investors 
9 investors, small shares 
 
 
 
Venture 
Local market need 
Attractive for advertisers 
Increasing number of visitors 
Breaking monopoly 
 
 
Partners/alliances 
None reported 
Entrepreneurs 
Know the trade  
Enthusiastic 
 
Team (management/board) 
Chair has start-up and funding 
experience  
Board and management have 
complementary competencies 
No external board members 
 
Investors 
Positive to have investors on 
board but not emphasized in 
relation to e.g., competence 
 
Venture 
Local market 
Strong need locally 
Strong competition on 
advertising income 
Product welcomed in market 
 
Partners/alliances 
(not considered) 
Feedback 
Fund investing under condition 
of more external capital 
 
Re-signaling 
Secure more external capital 
through new and existing 
investors, including family and 
friends 
 
 
Case D: On-line 
service  
 
One male 
entrepreneur 
Entrepreneur 
Portfolio entrepreneur 
Has extensive network 
Knows the industry 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Extended team/board 
Male chair, investor 
Three males (owners) 
Emphasize competence and 
seek competent board. Seek 
new, critical, bright and 
international experienced board 
members to increase 
heterogeneity 
 
Investors  
4 investors ‘on board’ 
Entrepreneur 
Trustworthy, good track-record. 
Well known and media profile. 
Knows the industry.  
Market oriented, lack 
international experience.  
Have ideas for further 
development of venture  
Is a “stayer,” serious and honest 
Lead entrepreneur crucial for 
success of the venture 
 
Extended team/board 
Partners and board members 
have primarily contributed with 
financial capital. Need board 
member/manager with 
experience from international 
business 
 
 
 
Investors 
Feedback 
Board needs to be 
supplemented with competence 
in international sales/ 
marketing and online sales, and 
should establish contacts with 
industrial actors in the market.  
New owners/more equity 
capital needed. 
Lead entrepreneur needs to 
focus on this venture 
 
Re-signaling 
More equity capital in place, 
owners increased their capital 
and seed fund invested 
 
Signaler Signals sent Signals interpreted Feedback and re-signaling 
2 new investors with good track 
record have shown interest  
 
 
 
 
Venture  
Interesting market segment 
Innovative business model and 
with little used market strategy  
Growing market 
Large international potential 
 
 
 
Partners/alliances 
None reported 
Positive that the entrepreneurs 
are in dialogue with potential 
investors and seed fund – 
sharing the risk with the 
investment fund 
 
Venture 
Most likely one of the best 
cases in the region now. 
Extremely interesting case. 
Global market, large market 
opportunities and market 
growth. Exit options present. 
IPO is a valid option 
 
Partners/alliances 
(not considered) 
 
